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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce a
development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.SHOULD COUNTRIES PROMOTE
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Abstract
This paper examines whether policies to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) make
economic sense. The discussion focuses on whether existing academic research suggests that
the benefits of FDI are sufficient to justify the kind of policy interventions seen in practice.
For small open economies, efficient taxation of foreign and domestic capital depends on
their relative mobility. If foreign and domestic capital are equally mobile internationally, it will
be optimal for countries to subject both types of capital to equal tax treatment. If foreign capital
is more mobile internationally, it will be optimal to have lower taxes on capital owned by foreign
residents than on capital owned by domestic residents. Absent market failure, there is no
justification for favouring FDI over foreign portfolio investment. In practice, countries appear
to tax income from foreign capital at rates lower than those for domestic capital and to subject
different forms of foreign investment to very different tax treatment. FDI appears to be sensitive
to host-country characteristics. Higher taxes deter foreign investment, while a more educated
work force and larger goods markets attract FDI. There is also some evidence that multinationals
tend to agglomerate in a manner consistent with location-specific externalities.
There is weak evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for host economies. While
multinationals are attracted to high-productivity countries, and to high-productivity industries
within these countries, there is little evidence at the firm or plant level that FDI raises the
productivity of domestic enterprises. Indeed, it appears that plants in industries with a larger
multinational presence tend to enjoy lower rates of productivity growth over time. Empirical
research thus provides little support for the idea that promoting FDI is warranted on welfare
grounds.
Subsidies to FDI are more likely to be warranted where multinationals are intensive in the
use of elastically supplied factors, where the arrival of multinationals to a market does not
lower the market share of domestic firms, and where FDI generates strong positive productivity
spillovers for domestic agents. Empirical research suggests that the first and third conditions
are unlikely to hold. In the three cases we examine, it appears that the second condition holds,
but not the first or third conditions. This suggests that Brazil’s subsidies to foreign automobile
manufacturers may have lowered national welfare. Costa Rica appears to have been prudent in
not offering subsidies in the case of Intel.
There clearly is a need for much more research on the host-economy consequences of FDI.
The impression from existing academic literature is that countries should be sceptical about
claims that promoting FDI will raise national welfare. A sensible approach for policy makes in
host countries is to presume that subsidizing FDI is unwarranted, unless clear evidence is
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I. Introduction
There is a presumption among many academ-
ics and policy makers that foreign direct investment
(FDI) is somehow special.1 One common view is that
FDI helps accelerate the process of economic de-
velopment in host countries. Optimism about the
economic consequences of foreign investment, cou-
pled with heightened awareness about the importance
of new technologies for economic growth, has con-
tributed to wide-reaching changes in national policies
on FDI. During the last two decades, many emerg-
ing economies have dramatically reduced barriers to
FDI, and countries at all levels of development have
created a policy infrastructure to attract multinational
firms.2 Standard tactics to promote FDI include the
extension of tax holidays, exemptions from import
duties, and the offer of direct subsidies. Since 1998,
103 countries have offered special tax concessions
to foreign corporations that have set up production
or administrative facilities within their borders (Avi-
Yonah, 1999). Typically, these concessions are
applied to multinational enterprises but not to local
firms in the same lines of activity.
In this paper, we examine whether policies to
promote FDI make economic sense. While eliminat-
ing barriers to foreign investment is a means of
achieving global market integration, promoting FDI
goes one step further by favouring one form of inte-
gration – expanded foreign control of productive
assets – over others, such as increased trade in goods,
more international licensing of technology, or larger
cross-border flows of portfolio capital. Assessing the
consequences of promoting FDI for national welfare
is a big task and one we in no way pretend to com-
plete in full. We focus on whether existing academic
research suggests that the benefits of FDI are suffi-
cient to justify the kind of policy interventions seen
in practice. This will help to identify a set of practi-
cal guidelines for when and where promoting FDI
might be welfare-enhancing.
In the remainder of the introduction, we frame
the discussion by outlining the conditions under
which economic theory suggests that government
policies favouring foreign over domestic capital are
justified. In section II, we briefly review the types of
policy incentives that the Group of 24 (G-24) and
other countries offer to multinational firms;3 this will
help to establish notions of standard practice. In
section III, we survey the theoretical and empirical
literature on FDI, with emphasis on research which
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nalities for host countries. In section IV, we develop
a simple theoretical model of FDI, which we then
use to evaluate three cases in which developing-coun-
try governments have offered special incentives to
multinational firms – as in the cases of Ford and
General Motors (GM) in Brazil and Intel in Costa
Rica. The purpose of these case studies is to see
whether economic theory and relevant empirical lit-
erature would suggest that policy intervention in
favour of FDI was justified. Finally, in section V we
offer concluding remarks on factors to consider when
trying to determine whether promoting FDI will raise
host-country welfare.
Setting the stage: foreign versus domestic
investment
To begin, it is helpful to specify what we mean
by promoting FDI. The benchmark one adopts de-
pends on whether it is optimal for countries to subject
foreign and domestic capital to equal tax treatment.
Countries may have reason to tax domestic and for-
eign capital differently. For a small open economy
facing an immobile supply of labour and an interna-
tionally mobile supply of capital, the optimal factor
income tax falls entirely on labour (Gordon, 1986;
Razin and Sadka, 1991). Not taxing capital is sensi-
ble because the immobile factor bears the incidence
of any tax on factor incomes, making it more effi-
cient to tax the immobile factor directly.4 By
extension, if foreign capital is perfectly mobile but
domestic capital is not, then the optimal tax on fac-
tor incomes falls on domestic labour and capital but
not on foreign capital. More generally, if foreign capi-
tal is elastic in its supply relative to domestic capital,
then it is optimal for countries to tax income from
domestic capital at higher rates (where the optimal
tax rate on income from foreign capital may be posi-
tive if its supply elasticity is less than infinite).5
If one presumes that domestic and foreign capi-
tal are equally elastic in supply (for example, if they
are equally mobile internationally), then promoting
FDI means any policy which subjects FDI to favour-
able tax treatment relative to domestic investment
and foreign portfolio investment (whether in the form
of debt or equity). If, on the other hand, one pre-
sumes that foreign capital is more elastic in supply
than domestic capital, then promoting FDI means any
policy which favours direct investment inflows over
portfolio investment inflows, holding constant a
country’s relative tax treatment of domestic invest-
ment income and foreign investment income.
For FDI to merit special treatment, there needs
to be market failure that is specific to production by
multinational firms.6 Asymmetric information be-
tween domestic and foreign investors is one
commonly mentioned source of market failure,
though one that is not specific to FDI. If domestic
investors are better informed about domestic invest-
ment opportunities than foreign investors, then, all
else equal, a capital-importing country would raise
welfare by subsidizing foreign capital inflows
(Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996). Could asymmetric
information justify favouring FDI over foreign port-
folio investment? Razin et al. (1998) suggest the
answer is no. Since FDI, but not portfolio invest-
ment, gives a foreign investor a controlling interest
in a domestic firm, multinational firms are likely to
be at an informational advantage relative to foreign
portfolio investors (though not relative to domestic
ones). In this case, the optimal tax policy is to subsi-
dize foreign portfolio investment and to leave FDI
untaxed.7
There are other sources of market failure which
could justify special treatment of FDI (Caves, 1995).
A much cited possibility is that FDI generates pro-
ductivity spillovers for the host economy (Blomstrom
and Kokko, 1998). One idea is that multinational
enterprises possess superior production technology
and management techniques, some of which are cap-
tured by local firms when multinationals locate in a
particular economy.8 A related source of spillovers
is forward and backward linkages between multina-
tional and host-economy firms (Rodriguez-Clare,
1996), which may result from multinationals provid-
ing inputs at lower cost to local downstream buyers
or by their increasing demand for inputs produced
by local upstream suppliers. A further possibility is
that FDI shifts rents earned by multinationals to the
host economy (Glass and Saggi, 1999; Janeba, 1996).
Multinationals may have global market power and
may share monopoly rents with managers and work-
ers in their various operational units. By attracting
multinational firms, the host economy may capture
a portion of the rents that these firms generate.9
While these and other types of market failure
are plausible, each is also subject to controversy.
Spillovers associated with FDI are supported by
casual evidence from many countries, but their ex-
istence and magnitude are, as we shall see, difficult
to establish empirically. Indeed, micro evidence from
large samples of manufacturing plants in developing
countries fails to support the existence of positive
productivity spillovers related to FDI. There is also
reason to believe that multinational enterprises tend3 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
to have market power in their respective industries.
Whether or not they share rents with employees in
their foreign affiliates is an empirical question. At-
tracting FDI may shift a portion of the rents that
multinationals earn to the host economy, but it may
also reduce the profits of local firms that compete
with multinationals at home or abroad.10
Arguments for promoting FDI are based on
claims concerning the economic environment, which
can and should be subject to empirical verification.
Before deciding to promote FDI, it is essential to
evaluate possible sources of market failure associ-
ated with multinational firms. It is this task to which
we devote much of the paper.
II. Promotion of FDI in practice
In this section, we summarize current govern-
ment policies to promote FDI in G-24 and other
countries. We begin with a brief review of corporate
taxation at the national level and then discuss the
range of tax and other incentives which countries
offer to multinational enterprises. The source for all
data, except where noted, are annual editions of
Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary by Price
Waterhouse.
Policies to promote FDI take a variety of forms.
The most common are partial or complete exemp-
tions from corporate taxes and import duties. These
policies are typically the result of formal legislation
or presidential decree, which apply to all foreign
corporations that meet certain restrictions. These
restrictions vary considerably across countries. In
many cases they require multinationals to establish
production facilities in the host country in specified
lines of activities or designated regions, such as ex-
port-processing zones (EPZs), and to export output
embodying inputs imported duty-free. Direct sub-
sidies and other types of concessions are often
negotiated between multinational firms and host
governments on a case-by-case basis. Such individu-
alized subsidies appear to be common, but are hard
to document systematically.
Table 1 shows corporate tax rates in 1990 and
1998 for each G-24 country for which data are avail-
able and averaged across regions for other selected
countries.11 Since some countries have progressive
tax rates (lower rates for smaller corporations) or
rates which vary across sectors, we report the mini-
mum and maximum tax rates which apply to
corporate income. In 1998 the maximum tax rates
on corporate income in the G-24 countries ranged
from a high of 57 per cent in Iran to a low of 25 per
cent in Brazil. Several countries – including Argen-
tina, Columbia, Guatemala, Peru, the Philippines and
Sri Lanka – tax corporate income at a flat rate, while
others – including Ghana, Iran, Mexico, and Trini-
dad and Tobago – tax income earned by small
corporations at rates much lower than for large cor-
porations. Between 1990 and 1998 most countries
reduced their maximum corporate income tax rates,
with high-tax countries undertaking the largest cuts
in absolute terms.
Tax rates in individual G-24 countries are
roughly comparable to the averages for other coun-
tries in their respective regions. A few outliers are
apparent. On a region-by-region basis, tax rates in
1998 were relatively high in the Republic of the
Congo, India, Iran and Pakistan. Tax rates in North
America, Oceania and Western Europe are on aver-
age similar to those in Latin America, and lower than
those in Africa and Asia.
Tables 2–5 give a brief description of how G-24
and a sample of five other countries treat foreign
corporations that operate within their borders.12 Most
countries for which data are available grant corpo-
rate income tax exemptions to foreign corporations
making inward direct investments. Typically, these
exemptions last for less than a decade from the ini-
tiation of a new project, though in some cases they
are long-lived. Most countries also offer exemptions
to foreign corporations on import duties, where these
tend to be restricted to inputs that are used to
produce exports or, in a few cases, capital goods. Ex-
emptions from value-added taxes are a somewhat less
common tax concession that countries grant multi-
national firms. Similar tax concessions are also
available to domestic firms in some countries, though
these concessions are for the most part tied to par-
ticipation in EPZs, export activities outside of such
zones, or production in officially designated priority
sectors or regions. Comparing 1990 with 1998, there
is a slight increase in the number of countries offer-
ing exemptions from valued-added taxes and import
duties and supporting EPZs.13
Not included in the tables are details on direct
subsidies which host governments offer to multi-
national firms on a case-by-case basis. These
arrangements are frequently unpublicized, but the
practice appears to be relatively common. Brazil is
one country which actively pursues multinational
firms and has offered generous subsidies in a number4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 9
Table 1
CORPORATE TAX RATES FOR G-24 AND OTHER COUNTRIES, 1990 AND 1998
1990 1998
Min. rate Max. rate Min. rate Max. rate
Group of 24
Congo 49.0 49.0 45.0 45.0
Egypt 34.0 42.0 34.0 42.0
Gabon 40.0 45.0 40.0 45.0
Ghana 8.0 35.0
Nigeria 20.0 40.0 20.0 30.0
India 50.0 64.8 40.0 43.0
Iran 12.0 75.0 15.0 57.0
Pakistan 45.0 66.0
Philippines 35.0 35.0 34.0 34.0
Sri Lanka 35.0 35.0
Argentina 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0
Brazil 6.3 41.5 15.0 25.0
Colombia 30.0 30.0 35.0 35.0
Guatemala 12.0 34.0 30.0 30.0
Mexico 36.0 36.0 17.0 34.0
Peru 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0
Trinidad & Tobago 15.0 40.0 15.0 35.0
Venezuela 15.0 50.0
Other countries (regional averages)
Africa 36.2 46.5 25.8 35.6
East Asia 24.1 39.8 20.0 42.1
Eastern Europe 0.0 40.0 33.4 35.0
Latin America 19.2 31.7 24.5 28.5
Middle East 12.7 39.3 11.3 34.4
North America 27.5 47.3 26.6 48.3
Oceania 41.0 41.0 34.5 34.5
South East Asia 26.0 39.8 22.6 29.2
Western Europe 37.2 43.1 33.5 37.2
Source: Price Waterhouse (1990).
Note: This table shows minimum and maximum corporate income tax rates for selected countries. See text for details. Data is more
detailed for some countries than others. Approximations are made in certain cases.
of instances (see the GM and Ford examples in
section IV). For instance, the country gives gener-
ous tax incentives to firms that locate manufacturing
facilities in the Amazon region. Unspecified govern-
ment subsidies appeared to be important in luring
Multibras (a US-owned firm) to construct a $400
million plant to manufacture air conditioners and
microwave ovens in Manaus in 1998. Investment
subsidies also appeared to be important in convinc-
ing Honda to build a motorcycle plant in the area. In
the absence of tax breaks, there appears to be little
reason why multinationals would locate in the re-
gion.
Poorer countries in Europe have also been ag-
gressive in pursuing multinational firms. To give a
few examples: in 1991 Portugal provided a lump-





















































TAX CONCESSIONS FOR INWARD FDI IN G-24 COUNTRIES, 1990
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Available to domestic corporations?
Corporate income Value-added Import duty EPZ
Country tax exemption Period Sectors tax exemption Items exemption Items provision (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Egypt X 5–20 yearsa Allb X
Gabon X 0–10 years All Xc
Nigeria X 0–5 years A, M, P Xd E, M Xe E, M, R X X X
Congo X 5–15 years P
Argentina X E, R X
Brazil X E, P X E, P Xf
Guatemala Xg PX h PX i Xj
Mexico (tax credits) X E, P
Peru X A, P * P X X
Venezuela X A
India X 5 years Allk XE X X X
Pakistan X 2–8 years K, A, P *l E ,  M X E X XXXX
Philippines X 3–6 years Allm X E, K, P, R X X X X
Source: Price Waterhouse (1990).
Note: • * = taxed at lower rate. • A = agriculture. • E = exported goods/exporting. • K = capital.
• M = manufacturing. • P = priority companies/industries. • R = raw materials. • X = country offered concession in indicated year.
• Data is more detailed for some countries than others. Approximations are made in certain cases.
a Maximum of 20 years if it is a project for medium-sized and economical housing, whose whole units are leased vacant for dwelling.
b In July 1989, a new investment law was issued and it offered a projects’ profits to be exempt from tax on industrial and commercial profits and from corporate tax.
c More restrictions apply on domestic corporations than on foreign corporations.
d Excise duty paid on export manufactures is refundable.
e Refund of import duty.
f Excise and sales and service tax exemptions are granted to exporters of manufactured goods.
g The government may grant exemptions from duties and taxes if the enterprise is classified as either basic, necessary or useful, or if it is to be located outside the municipality of Guatemala.
h See 7.
i Exemptions from income taxes and import duties (up to 100 per cent for a maximum 10-year period) may also be granted to industries originally located (or, if existing, transferred) outside of the
Department of Guatemala, site of the capital city.
j See 9.
k New industrial undertaking in free trade zones, or a 100 per cent export-oriented undertaking is entirely exempt from income tax, subject to certain conditions.
l Companies exporting goods manufactured in Pakistan can claim a rebate of 50 per cent on the tax attributable to such export sales. However, in respect of certain specified goods, the tax rebate
is available at 25 per cent or 75 per cent.






































TAX CONCESSIONS FOR INWARD FDI IN COMPARISON COUNTRIES, 1990
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Available to domestic corporations?
Corporate income Value-added Import duty EPZ
Country tax exemption Period Sectors tax exemption Items exemption Items provision (I) (II) (III) (IV)




Thailand X 3–8 years P Xd E, R, K X X X
Source: Price Waterhouse (1990).
Note: • * = taxed at lower rate.
• A = agriculture.
• E = exported goods/exporting.
• K = capital.
• M = manufacturing.
• P  = priority companies/industries.
• R = raw materials.
• X = country offered concession in indicated year.
• Data is more detailed for some countries than others. Approximations are made in certain cases.
a Tax benefits and other incentives for companies operating in northernmost and southernmost parts of the country. Tax benefits to forestry companies also.
b Reimbursement of taxes paid.
c Companies that commenced operation within the Shannon Free Airport before 1 January 1981 can obtain full exemption from corporation tax until 5 April 1990 if the income is derived from the
carrying on of certain activities, including exporting goods and a wide range of services.





















































TAX CONCESSIONS FOR INWARD FDI IN G-24 COUNTRIES, 1998
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Available to domestic corporations?
Corporate income Value-added Import duty EPZ
Country tax exemption Period Sectors tax exemption Items exemption Items provision (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Côte d’Ivoire X 5–8 years All X All
Egypt X 5–20 years Alla  X
Gabon X 0–10 years All  Xb
Nigeria X 0–5 years P, E, A, M X Allc X E, R X  X X X X
Congo  Xd 0–10 years A, P, M
Argentina (tax credit bonds) X E X E, R X X
Brazil X E, P X E, P Xe
Guatemalaf X E X K, E, R X X X X
Mexico (tax credits) X E
Peru X Allg X Allh XX
India X 5 years Alli XE X X X
Philippines X 3–6 years Allj X Allk X All X  X X X X
Sri Lanka X P X P  X  X
Source: Price Waterhouse (1998).
Note: • * = taxed at lower rate. • A = agriculture. • E = exported goods/exporting. • K = capital.
• M = manufacturing. • P = priority companies/industries. • R = raw materials. • X = country offered concession in indicated year.
• Data is more detailed for some countries than others. Approximations are made in certain cases.
a An investment and guarantee law effective as of 11 May 1997 offers the profits of a project formed under it to be exempt from tax on industrial and commercial profits and from corporate tax.
b More restrictions apply on domestic corporations than on foreign corporations.
c 1998 budget abolishes payment of excise duties.
d Tax priority status giving exemption (or a reduction ) from various taxes and custom duties for up to 10 years can be obtained by notification of agreement.
e Excise and sales and service tax exemptions are granted to exporters of manufactured goods.
f In general, exemption from payment of import duties on machinery and equipment and on raw and packaging materials and from income tax is available for those corporations classified as exporting
companies. These exemptions also apply to free trade zones.
g Industrial entities established in the jungle, frontier zones and free trade zones are exempt from income tax.
h Exemption from value-added tax (VAT) is provided for industrial entities established in the jungle and frontier zones.
i New industrial undertakings satisfying certain conditions established in a free trade zone, software technology park, or electronic hardware technology park, or a 100 per cent export-oriented
undertaking is entirely exempt from income tax.
j Income tax holiday giving full exemption from corporate income tax for six years for pioneer firms and those locating in less-developed area, and four years for non-pioneer firms from the date
of commercial operation; expanding export-oriented firms are given three years.





































TAX CONCESSIONS FOR INWARD FDI IN COMPARISON COUNTRIES, 1998
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Available to domestic corporations?
Corporate income Value-added Import duty EPZ
Country tax exemption Period Sectors tax exemption Items exemption Items provision (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Chile Xa Xb EX
Ireland *c
Japan (tax credits)d X
South Africa Xe X
Thailand X 3–8 years P Xf K, R, E
Source: Price Waterhouse (1998).
Note: • * = taxed at lower rate.
• A = agriculture.
• E = exported goods/exporting.
• K = capital.
• M = manufacturing.
• P = priority companies/industries.
• R = raw materials.
• X = country offered concession in indicated year.
• Data is more detailed for some countries than others. Approximations are made in certain cases.
a Tax benefits and other incentives for companies operating in northernmost and southernmost parts of the country. Tax benefits to forestry companies also.
b Reimbursement of taxes paid.
c Reduced rate of corporation tax of 10 per cent of profits from manufacturing operations arising between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 2010, regardless of whether the goods are exported.
Definition of manufacturing operations is rather lenient.
d A corporation tax credit of 3.5 per cent or 7 per cent of the adjusted acquisition cost (25 per cent to 100 per cent) of certain designated, energy-saving machinery and equipment, or 7 per cent of
the acquisition cost of certain designated machinery and equipment containing electronic computer systems acquired by designated small or medium-size corporations is available. The credit is
limited to 20 per cent of the corporation tax otherwise payable.
e Tax holiday granted at discretion to an enterprise with qualifying assets in excess of R3 million, incorporated on or after 1 October 1996, for the sole object of carrying out a qualifying project.
f Either exemption or reduction.9 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
earnings to Ford and Volkswagen in return for their
constructing a jointly operated automobile produc-
tion facility in the country; in 1995 Ireland granted
employment subsidies to IBM and Citibank for lo-
cating data-processing jobs in the country (and
granted similar subsidies to Berg Electronics the fol-
lowing year); and in 1996 Turkey enticed Honda to
build a new automobile production facility in the
country by easing tax rules on new plants and relax-
ing import duties on automobile parts. Subsidies are
by no means limited to relatively low-income regions.
Germany offered investment subsidies to Advanced
Mirco Devices in 1995, after it decided to build a
semi-conductor plant in Saxony, and to Motorola in
1998, after it decided to build a new facility in Ba-
varia. In the United States investment subsidies from
state governments helped attract Mercedes-Benz to
Alabama and BMW to North Carolina.
Tables 2–5 indicate that most countries do not
follow the residence principle (see note 5) in setting
tax policies.14 While many countries tax domestic
income earned by foreign corporations at lower rates
than domestic income earned by domestic corpora-
tions, the former rates are in most cases above zero
in the long run (though often not during the first few
years following the establishment of a project). For-
eign tax credits, which allow corporations to deduct
taxes paid to foreign governments from their tax li-
ability on foreign income, complicates the picture.
As of the mid-1990s, Japan, the United Kingdom and
the United States granted foreign tax credits to mul-
tinational corporations based within their respective
borders, and many other high-income countries –
including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Switzerland – exempted the foreign
earnings of their firms from domestic taxation (Hines,
1996). Where foreign tax credits apply, and where a
country’s tax rate on domestic income earned by for-
eign corporations does not exceed the home-country
tax rate for these firms, taxing foreign corporations
merely shifts tax revenue from FDI source countries
to FDI host countries and does not necessarily dis-
tort investment.
One important question is whether the conces-
sions offered to foreign corporations shown in ta-
ble 2 represent favourable treatment of inward FDI
relative to inward foreign portfolio investment. A full
evaluation of the issue is beyond the scope of this
paper. Income from inward portfolio equity invest-
ment, portfolio debt investment, and direct invest-
ment are governed by complicated tax rules, which
vary considerably across countries.15 We shall, how-
ever, hazard a few general comments. Table 2 shows
that income from inward direct investment is sub-
ject to myriad tax breaks in G-24 and other coun-
tries. With regard to inward portfolio equity invest-
ment, the presence of capital gains taxes, which vary
from country to country, would tend to disfavour this
vehicle relative to FDI.16 With regard to portfolio debt
investment, the recent abolition of withholding taxes
on portfolio interest income for foreign residents
(Avi-Yonah, 1999), which has occurred throughout
the OECD and in many developing countries as well,
would tend to favour this vehicle relative to FDI. The
absence of portfolio interest income withholding
taxes means that foreigners do not pay tax on in-
come they earn from corporate or government bonds,
bank accounts or certificates of deposit in a country.
To summarize briefly, it appears that many countries
may have tax policies which favour FDI relative to
some types of inward portfolio investment, but dis-
favour it relative to others.
Other policies clearly do favour FDI. A coun-
try that offers exemptions to value-added taxes or
import duties to foreign but not domestic corpora-
tions favours FDI, since domestic corporations which
receive foreign bank loans, issue bonds to foreign-
ers, or have a non-controlling portion of their stock
owned by foreigners do not receive comparable tax
breaks. EPZs do not favour FDI over foreign portfo-
lio investment, so long as domestic firms have equal
access to EPZs (which is often the case) and are
equally likely to engage in export production as are
multinationals (which is less likely to be the case).
Direct subsidies to multinational firms (examples of
which we discuss in section IV) also favour FDI rela-
tive to other forms of inward foreign investment.
III. FDI and host-country economic
performance
There is immense academic literature on FDI
and multinational firms. Since our interests are rather
narrow, we focus here on empirical research which
studies the impact of FDI on host economies. Within
this literature, we emphasize two strands: one which
examines the determinants of where multinationals
locate production facilities and another which ex-
amines sources of market failure related to FDI. We
shall begin with a brief review of theories of multi-
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A. What explains multinational
production?
Following Dunning (1981, 1993), it is standard
practice to view multinational enterprises as arising
from three distinct types of advantages. A firm must
own or control a unique mobile asset (e.g. a patent
or trademark) it wishes to exploit (the ownership
advantage); it must be cost efficient to exploit the
asset abroad in addition to, or instead of in, the firm’s
home country (the location advantage); and it must
be in the firm’s interest to control the asset’s exploi-
tation itself, rather than contracting out use of the
asset to an independent foreign firm (the internali-
zation advantage). For instance, GM will engage in
FDI when it has a design for a car which could be
manufactured abroad more efficiently than at home
and whose production the firm wishes to control
through ownership of the factory in which it is made.
When GM wishes to sell cars in Brazil (a case we
will consider later), it will choose FDI – setting up
its own subsidiary in the region – when this option
dominates exporting to Brazil from GM plants in the
United States (or elsewhere) and contracting out pro-
duction of GM cars (or licensing its technology and
brand name) to an independent Brazilian firm.
The general equilibrium theories of multination-
als attempt to explain how environmental conditions
arise which favour production by multinationals over
other forms of global market integration.17 Common
to these theories is the idea that to produce a good a
firm must incur fixed costs – such as R&D to gener-
ate a patent, advertising to create a brand name, or
corporate investments to establish a management
structure – which can support production in many
plants. A firm consists of an upstream facility, which
undertakes fixed-cost “headquarters” activities, and
one or more downstream production plants. A mul-
tinational is simply a firm with upstream and
downstream facilities located in multiple countries.
Suppose that headquarters activities are rela-
tively skill- or capital-intensive and that production
is relatively labour-intensive. If factor prices are not
equalized across countries, then a firm has an incen-
tive to become a multinational in order to exploit
differences in factor costs between countries. It could
do so by locating its headquarters in a capital-abun-
dant (low-capital cost, high-wage) country and
production in a labour-abundant (high-capital cost,
low-wage) country. This would give rise to vertical
FDI – the creation of a multinational whose coun-
try operations specialize each in a distinct vertical
stage of production (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and
Krugman, 1985).
Alternatively, suppose that factor prices are
equalized across countries, or nearly so, but trade
barriers or transport costs make it expensive to ship
goods abroad. When trade costs are low, a firm will
produce all its output in domestic plants and serve
foreign consumers through exports. When trade costs
are high, it is optimal for the firm to build produc-
tion plants both at home and abroad, so that it serves
domestic consumers from its domestic plants and
foreign consumers from its foreign plants (Markusen,
1984). This is a case of horizontal FDI, in which the
multinational undertakes similar production activi-
ties in all countries. Activities at its headquarters,
however, remain concentrated in one country only.
Recent work combines cross-country differences in
factor and trade costs to develop a general frame-
work for determining when multinationals (versus
purely national firms which may or may not export)
will be in operation (Markusen and Venables, 1998
and 1999a).18
The creation of multinational firms raises glo-
bal welfare by leading to a more efficient global
allocation of resources.19 In the models described
above, the absence of distortions specific to FDI
means that there is no policy justification for treat-
ing multinationals differently from domestic firms.
Nevertheless, policies to promote FDI would en-
courage multinational production by raising the
advantages of multinationality. From the perspective
of a multinational firms, subsidizing FDI (i) lowers
production costs and so raises the incentive to create
patents, trademarks, or other assets which sustain
headquarters activities; (ii) enhances the relative at-
tractiveness of locating production in the country
offering incentives; and (iii) raises the economic ben-
efits of FDI relative to exporting and arms-length
production in the host country.
An emerging body of literature considers how
production externalities affect the behaviour of mul-
tinationals and the impact of FDI on host economies.
The existence of externalities associated with FDI
raises the possibility that promoting FDI may be
welfare-enhancing. One line of work suggests that
the arrival of multinational firms in an economy may
help jump-start the process of industrial development
by increasing the scale of operations in domestic
upstream and downstream industries – that is, by
creating forward and backward linkages. In Rodriguez-
Clare (1996), the arrival of multinationals increases
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puts (which are produced in more developed econo-
mies and accessible abroad only through multi-
nationals), which in turn raises the economy’s total
factor productivity. The idea is that multinationals
in effect give less developed economies access to
the stock of knowledge capital (which is one inter-
pretation of specialized intermediate inputs) in more
developed economies. This access makes labour and
other factors in the host economy more productive.
Multinationals crowd domestic firms out of produc-
tion, which raises the possibility that some domestic
factors of production may lose from FDI. Under some
conditions, the demand for labour by the entering
multinationals is weaker than that for the exiting
domestic firms, in which case the arrival of multina-
tionals may lower national welfare. Thus, the “link-
age” effect of multinationals on factor demand may
be positive or negative.
There are other mechanisms through which
multinationals impact industrial expansion in host
countries. Gao (1999) offers a model in which the
creation of multinational firms spreads industry from
more to less industrialized countries, thereby reduc-
ing industrial concentration in the former. By less-
ening industry agglomeration, multinationals raise
national welfare in less industrialized regions, but
may lower it in more industrialized ones. Markusen
and Venables (1999b) offer a similar model in which
the “catalyst” effect of multinationals on a host
economy (through forward and backward linkages)
may spur domestic industry so much as to drive mul-
tinationals out of the market. Additionally, while
multinationals create forward and backward linkages,
they also increase competition for local firms, and
thus may redistribute income away from some groups
– e.g. specific factors in industrial production
(Matouschek, 1999). If the impact of multinationals
on the profitability of domestic firms is sufficiently
negative, FDI may lower host-country welfare, in
which case the optimal policy towards FDI is a tax
(Glass and Saggi, 1999).
Another mechanism through which multination-
als may create spillovers for local industry is worker
training. If multinationals bring new technology into
an economy, then local firms may benefit by being
able to hire workers whose training costs have in ef-
fect been paid by the multinational (Motta et al.,
1999). Of course, multinationals may bid to retain
these workers, in which case domestic labour cap-
tures the full benefit of worker training. In either case,
multinationals raise national welfare.
B. What determines the location of
multinational production?
A large empirical literature examines the fac-
tors which determine where multinational enterprises
locate their production facilities. We discuss this lit-
erature briefly in order to identify the potential
efficacy of using tax incentives to attract FDI.
One strand of literature applies general equi-
librium theories of multinationals to data to see
whether FDI is associated with variation in trade costs
or factor costs across countries. Theory predicts that
firms will penetrate foreign markets through FDI
when trade costs are low, firm-level scale economies
are high (i.e. the fixed costs associated with head-
quarters activities are high), and plant-level scale
economies are low (i.e. the costs of having plants
both at home and abroad are low). Conversely, firms
will penetrate foreign markets through exports when
trade costs are low and plant level scale economies
are high. Theory also predicts that firms will pen-
etrate foreign markets through vertical FDI when
factor-cost differences between countries are large,
and through horizontal FDI when countries are simi-
lar in terms of market size and factor cost.
A common measure of how firms from a given
source country penetrate a given host market is the
level of sales in the host market by foreign affiliates
of firms from the source country (normalized by to-
tal sales from the source country to the host country,
which equal affiliate sales plus exports).20 Using data
on exports by US manufacturing industries and sales
by foreign manufacturing affiliates of US multina-
tionals, Brainard (1997) finds that affiliate sales in a
given industry and country are positively correlated
with trade costs (freight rates, tariff rates) to the coun-
try and average firm size in the industry, and
negatively correlated with average plant size in the
industry. Brainard interprets these results to mean
that, consistent with theory, higher trade costs and
stronger firm-level scale economies encourage FDI
relative to exports, while stronger plant-level scale
economies discourage FDI relative to exports. She
also finds that higher host-country taxes appear to
encourage affiliate sales over exporting, which is
counter-intuitive.
Yeaple (1999) extends Brainard’s approach and
finds that for more skill-intensive industries affiliate
sales are positively correlated with average educa-
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this result to mean that countries with larger sup-
plies of human capital are more likely to attract FDI,
especially in sectors which are relatively intensive
in the use of skilled labour. In related work, Markusen
and Maskus (1999a and 1999b), using data on ag-
gregate sales by foreign affiliates of US multina-
tionals and aggregate sales by affiliates of foreign
multinationals in the United States, find that affili-
ate sales are higher when source and host countries
have relatively similar market sizes but are unrelated
to differences in the relative supply of skilled labour
in source and host countries. They interpret these
results to mean that multinationals have expanded
their global production operations more through hori-
zontal FDI than through vertical FDI.
The empirical work cited above is general equi-
librium in orientation, in that it is based on estimating
a reduced form relationship between exports and/or
multinational sales and measures of industrial tech-
nology, and country trade costs, size and factor
supplies. All prices and outputs are implicitly en-
dogenous. Other research takes a partial equilibrium
approach in that it examines the impact of policy or
other host-country conditions on FDI, holding con-
stant at least some prices and sectoral outputs. This
line of work focuses on the country characteristics
which appear to attract multinational firms.
In a widely cited paper, Wheeler and Mody
(1992) examine outward foreign investments by US
multinational enterprises. They find that US outward
FDI is higher in countries with larger markets, a larger
stock of initial FDI, higher quality of infrastructure,
and more industrialized economies. These results are
broadly consistent with theory. The authors interpret
the correlation between current and past FDI to indi-
cate that multinationals are attracted to locations with
a larger concentration of industrial firms – that is,
that there are agglomeration economies associated
with FDI. Other results are less consistent with theory.
FDI is slightly higher in countries with higher la-
bour costs and corporate taxes.
These findings, which are representative of
other papers in this literature, raise a number of im-
portant questions. Is FDI truly subject to agglomera-
tion economies? Can it be that multinationals do not
take labour costs or tax rates into account in making
location decisions? If the answer to both questions
is yes, then host-country governments may have lim-
ited ability to influence multinational location deci-
sions through tax policy.
There are several reasons to be cautious in draw-
ing policy conclusions from regressions like those
that Wheeler and Mody report. One common prob-
lem in empirical work which examines the impact of
tax policy or agglomeration effects on firm location
decisions is that it is often difficult to control for the
impact of all relevant regional characteristics
(e.g. efficiency of local bureaucracy and local factor
productivity).21 Excluded characteristics are omitted
variables, whose existence may contaminate regres-
sion results. California, for instance, attracts
multinationals in part because it has a large pool of
labour which is highly skilled (and highly paid). The
state’s abundant resources may allow it to get away
with high corporate tax rates. If there are many in-
stances like California in the data (as well as opposite
cases like Arkansas which is a low wage, low tax,
and low FDI region), we would find that FDI is posi-
tively correlated with tax rates, labour costs and
industry agglomeration. But these correlations would
just be picking up the more fundamental relation-
ship between FDI and the local supply of skilled
labour. Since Wheeler and Mody-style regressions
do not control for this sort of possibility, they are
difficult to interpret.
Recent work in public finance attempts to ad-
dress these and other identification problems. Hines
(1997) summarizes research on the impact of taxa-
tion on FDI. Contrary to the impression given by
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Brainard (1997), Yeaple
(1999) and others, a growing tax literature finds that
FDI is lower in regions with higher corporate taxes.
The elasticity of FDI with respect to the after-tax
rate of return is approximately unity. One study which
controls for omitted variables in a particularly con-
vincing manner is Hines (1996), who examines the
allocation of inward FDI across US states. He com-
pares investment from countries which grant foreign
tax credits with countries that do not in high-tax ver-
sus low-tax US states. Relative to investors from
countries which grant foreign tax credits, investors
from countries which grant no tax credits should be
more sensitive to cross-state differences in tax rates.
Hines’ approach allows him to control for unobserved
factors which influence the attractiveness of a state
to foreign investors (and which are common to in-
vestors from different countries). His results imply
an elasticity of capital ownership with respect to state
taxes of –0.6. This suggests that multinationals are
influenced by cross-country or cross-region differ-
ences in tax rates.
With regard to agglomeration effects, Head et
al. (1995) examine the location decisions of new
Japanese manufacturing plants in the United States.
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tion of US plants in the same industry (among other
factors), Japanese plants are more likely to choose a
location where the existing local concentration of
Japanese manufacturing plants in the same industry
is higher. This finding is similar to Wheeler and
Mody’s that firms are attracted to large concentra-
tions of other industrial firms. But, by focusing on
Japanese plants and controlling for the location of
overall US manufacturing activity, this approach goes
further than previous studies in controlling for the
effects of unobserved, site-specific characteristics.22
This suggests that multinationals (at least the Japa-
nese firms in Head et al.’s data) are attracted to
locations with other firms in their own or related lines
of activity.23
C. Does FDI generate positive spillovers for
the host economy?
That multinational firms are different from
purely domestic firms is abundantly clear. Across
countries and time, several empirical regularities are
apparent. Relative to their domestic counterparts,
multinationals are larger, pay their workers higher
wages, have higher factor productivity, are more in-
tensive in capital, skilled labour, and intellectual
property are more profitable and are more likely to
export (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken et al.,
1997; Aitken et al., 1997; Aitken and Harrison, 1999;
Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999).24 That multination-
als possess these attributes is not surprising, given
that to become a viable multinational a firm must
have outperformed domestic and foreign rivals in
some dimension. The relative technological superi-
ority of multinationals also makes it possible that
they would be a direct or indirect source of techno-
logical advancement for domestic firms in host
countries, especially where these countries are rela-
tively far from the technological frontier.
Theory identifies several channels through
which multinationals generate externalities that raise
the productivity of host-country factors of produc-
tion. It is entirely possible, however, for the net effect
of such linkages on host-country welfare to be nega-
tive, once we take into account the impact of FDI on
the profitability of domestic firms. Whether spill-
overs from multinationals raise host-country welfare
is an empirical question.
Early literature is optimistic about the impact
of multinationals on host-country productivity.25
Caves (1974) finds a positive correlation between
industry average value-added per worker and the
share of industry employment in foreign firms for
Australian manufacturing in 1966.26 More recent
work confirms this basic finding in a wide array of
environments. A partial list of studies which find a
positive correlation between average industry pro-
ductivity and the presence of foreign firms in the
industry include Globerman (1979) for Canada in
1972; Blomstrom and Persson (1983), Blomstrom
(1986), and Kokko (1994) for Mexico in the 1970s;
and Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) for Indonesia in
1991. In related work, Borensztein et al. (1998) find
a weak positive correlation between FDI inflows and
per capita GDP growth for a panel of countries in
the 1970s and 1980s (although when they interact
FDI and the level of schooling, FDI has a negative
“direct effect” on growth and a positive “indirect
effect” through schooling).
Taking a slightly different approach, Mansfield
and Romeo (1980) use a sample of US-based multi-
nationals to examine which sorts of technology these
firms transfer abroad and whether there is leakage
of these technologies to non-US firms in host coun-
tries. They report that in 20 out of 26 cases transferred
technologies became known to foreign rivals within
six years. In nine of the cases, access to US technol-
ogy appeared to accelerate foreign firms’ introduction
of competing products or processes by two years or
more.27
What does it mean for industry productivity or
industry technology adoption to be positively corre-
lated with the presence of multinational firms in an
industry? A common interpretation of this finding is
that FDI creates positive productivity spillovers for
domestic firms in host countries. This interpretation,
however, is subject to the same concerns about
omitted variables and endogeneity bias that we
encountered in empirical work on the impact of taxes
and agglomeration effects on firm location decisions.
Most empirical studies in the literature use cross-
section data on average industry characteristics. A
positive simple correlation between industry produc-
tivity and the presence of multinationals is, in
principle, just as likely to mean that multinationals
are attracted to high-productivity industries as it is
to mean that multinationals raise host-country pro-
ductivity. Though most empirical studies introduce
additional controls in estimating the correlation be-
tween industry productivity and multinational
presence, the included variables surely do not ex-
haust the set of factors which are likely to influence
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Recent work attempts to address these identifi-
cation problems through using micro-level, time-
series data on individual manufacturing plants. By
looking at how the productivity of domestic plants
changes over time in response to the presence of
multinationals, it is possible to control for the pres-
ence of unobserved factors which influence both the
productivity of domestic plants and the behaviour of
multinationals. Haddad and Harrison (1993), using
data on Moroccan manufacturing plants for the pe-
riod 1985–1989, find a weak negative correlation
between plant total factor productivity growth and
the presence of foreign firms in the sector. Foreign-
owned plants do have higher productivity (though
not higher productivity growth), and the industries
in which they are concentrated demonstrate less dis-
persion in plant productivity. In related work, Aitken
and Harrison (1999), using data on Venezuelan manu-
facturing plants for the period 1976–1989, find that
productivity growth in domestic plants is negatively
correlated with foreign presence in the sector.29 Based
on their estimates, a domestic plant in a sector with
50 per cent of employment in foreign-owned plants
would on average have 13 per cent lower annual pro-
ductivity growth than a domestic plant in a sector
with no foreign firms. They also find that foreign
plants are relatively productive and that higher-pro-
ductivity foreign plants tend to concentrate in cer-
tain sectors. Productivity growth in foreign plants,
in contrast to domestic plants, is positively corre-
lated with multinational presence.
The results of Haddad and Harrison and Aitken
and Harrison are consistent with a simple story, which
is quite different from that derived from older, in-
dustry-level, analyses. This is that multinational firms
concentrate in high-productivity sectors and that
domestic plants in these sectors, while having high
relative levels of productivity, experience even or
negative growth in productivity relative to plants in
other sectors. Micro-level data, then, appears to
undermine empirical support for positive net produc-
tivity spillovers from FDI, perhaps indicating that
multinationals confine competing domestic firms to
less profitable segments of industry.30
Another strand of literature examines whether
multinationals improve the access of host-country
firms to foreign markets. Based on casual observa-
tion and firm-level interviews, Rhee (1990) and Rhee
and Belot (1990) find that the arrival of multinational
firms contributed to the eventual export success of
one or more labour-intensive industries in 11 devel-
oping economies. Using data on Mexican manufac-
turing plants in the 1980s, Aitken et al. (1997) find
that the larger the concentration of multinational
firms in their region and industry, the more likely
Mexican manufacturing firms are to export. This
correlation is robust to controlling for industry ag-
glomeration in the region and for the endogeneity of
multinational location. In interpreting these results,
it is important to recognize that these studies exam-
ine economies in the aftermath of liberalization epi-
sodes, in which barriers to trade and FDI fell
considerably. Hence, the information spillovers these
studies detect may be confined to post-reform tran-
sition periods and therefore short-lived.31
IV. Evaluation of FDI in practice
To summarize key results of the literature on
FDI, we have seen that:
(i) the only justification for favouring FDI over
both foreign portfolio investment and domes-
tic investment is the existence of market failure
that is specific to multinational production;
(ii) G-24 and other countries offer myriad tax con-
cessions to FDI, which violates the residence
principle (by taxing non-resident income) and
subjects FDI and foreign portfolio investment
to unequal tax treatment;
(iii) in theory, FDI raises national welfare by bring-
ing foreign technology and other foreign
resources into an economy, which raises the
productivity of domestic factors, but in the ab-
sence of externalities there is no justification
for taxes or subsidies which are specific to FDI;
(iv) in theory, externalities associated with FDI may
raise or lower national welfare, depending on
whether positive productivity spillovers from
multinationals more than offset the loss in prof-
its due to crowding domestic firms out of the
market;
(v) empirical research suggests that FDI is sensi-
tive to both host-country tax polices and
economic conditions, including the education
level of the labour force, overall market size,
and the size of the local industrial base;
(vi) empirical research shows mixed support for the
idea that FDI generates positive spillovers for
domestic industry, while multinationals tend to
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high wages; on average (in at least some coun-
tries) their presence appears to depress the
productivity of domestic plants (perhaps by
driving them into less profitable market seg-
ments).
In this section, we apply insights from the lit-
erature to examine several cases of FDI promotion
policies. First, we build a simple theoretical model
of FDI. In this model, FDI raises the productivity of
domestic factors and possibly domestic firms, but
also increases competition with these firms. The ef-
fect of FDI on national welfare depends on the
relative magnitude of increased domestic factor in-
come versus the reduced profitability of domestic
industry. To show these effects in as transparent a
manner as possible, we identify some but not all the
general equilibrium effects of FDI. In particular, we
assume that subsidies to FDI are financed by lump-
sum taxes and we ignore other forms of foreign
investment. Given that tax policies in many coun-
tries may be inefficient [see (i) and (ii) above], we
are in a sense giving FDI promotion policies the
maximum benefit of the doubt by ignoring some of
their possibly more adverse distortionary conse-
quences.
Second, we describe three cases of FDI promo-
tion: projects by GM and Ford to build automobile
production plants in Brazil, and a project by Intel to
build a semi-conductor factory in Costa Rica. After
presenting the relevant details of the cases, we ex-
amine whether the theory developed in the first part
of this section and estimates of key behavioural pa-
rameters culled from empirical literature would
suggest that these policies were justified on welfare
grounds. This exercise is obviously far from exact,
since there are many details about the industries we
cannot observe and so do not address. Our intent is
to identify simple guidelines which policy makers
should take into account (under the presumption that
the point of promoting FDI is to raise national wel-
fare), and then see if the facts of the cases examined
suggest that policy makers adhered to these guide-
lines.
A. A theoretical model
In this section we develop a simple model of
multinational production, which we use to examine
the conditions under which subsidizing multinational
activities enhance host-economy welfare. Based on
the discussion in the last section, the arrival of a
multinational firm in a host economy potentially
(i) raises the demand for labour and other factors,
thus raising factor incomes; (ii) crowds domestic
firms out of the market, by bidding away resources
and capturing the market share from these firms; and
(iii) generates spillovers, which may raise or lower
the productivity (and profitability) of domestic firms.
The net effect of FDI on an economy is ambiguous;
in order to justify subsidies to FDI, the net welfare
effect of FDI should be positive and the social return
to FDI exceed the private return.
We would like a model which captures effects
(i)–(iii), facilitates analysis of FDI promotion poli-
cies and is tractable. With this in mind, we extend
the framework in Dixit and Grossman (1986) and Glass
and Saggi (1999) to allow for spillovers from FDI.
Consider a host economy which has two sectors:
an agricultural one, which is perfectly competitive
and hires unskilled labour only, and a manufacturing
sector consisting of N industries, each of which is
imperfectly competitive and hires unskilled and
skilled labour. Agriculture can be thought of as a
composite good, embodying the rest of the economy.
We take agriculture to be the numeraire for the
economy and define units of the good such that it
takes one unskilled worker to produce one unit of
output. The price of the good and the wage for un-
skilled labour are then both equal to one. To begin,
we assume that the majority of manufacturing out-
put is exported, which avoids complications involved
with calculating consumer surplus. We later discuss
relaxing this assumption.
Skilled labour represents a scarce resource,
which is used by relatively high-technology sectors,
such as manufacturing. We have in mind managers,
engineers and other high-skill workers, who tend to
be employed in technology-intensive, imperfectly
competitive industries. We could, alternatively, re-
define skilled labour as an input (management, R&D)
which is produced by a scarce factor and consumed
by manufacturing industries. This would be an
equivalent statement of the model.
We assume that each of the N manufacturing
industries contains a single domestic firm, which
“Cournot-competes” with a single foreign firm. The
model easily generalizes to the case of more domes-
tic and foreign firms. There may be fixed costs which
account for the industries’ oligopolistic structure, but
we do not need to account for them explicitly. A sin-
gle foreign firm in industry 1 contemplates locating
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These assumptions imply that firms in the do-
mestic economy have power to set prices on world
markets. This may be unrealistic for local firms in
many developing countries, but is likely to apply to
many multinationals which locate in developing re-
gions (including the firms we shall consider later on
in this paper: GM, Ford and Intel). In the event that
multinationals are the only firms with global market
power in the domestic economy, then the model col-
lapses to the case of a single perfectly competitive
sector and a single imperfectly competitive sector,
where the latter is dominated by a multinational.
Detailed assumptions of the model are as fol-
lows:
(a1) There are l units of unskilled labour and k units
of skilled labour in the host economy, where
skilled labour earns wage z. Total agricultural
output is x;
(a2) To produce one unit of output, a domestic firm
in industry i requires ai units of unskilled la-
bour and one unit of skilled labour. If the foreign
firm in industry 1 chooses to produce in the host
economy, it requires A1 unit of unskilled labour
and D1 units of skilled labour per unit of out-
put;
(a3) The revenue function for the domestic firm in
industry i is ri(yi,Yi, λ i(Yd
1)), where yi is the out-
put of the domestic firm, Yi is the output of the
rival foreign firm, Yd
1 is the domestic output of
foreign firm 1, and the function λ i() captures
productivity spillovers from foreign firm 1’s
domestic production to domestic industry i. As
is standard, r i
1 ≥  0, r i
11 ≤  0, r i
2 ≤  0, and r i
3 ≥  0
(where subscripts indicate partial derivatives by
order of argument in the revenue function). λ ’i
may be positive or negative. The revenue func-
tion for the rival foreign firm in industry i is
Ri(Yi,yi), where Ri
1 ≥  0, Ri
11 ≤  0, and Ri
2 ≤  0.
The first assumption is that factors are in in-
elastic supply. This assumption is not essential but
does help simplify the analysis. The second assump-
tion specifies that the unit factor demands of the
foreign firm may differ from those of the domestic
firm, which allows for the possibility that multina-
tionals may have relatively weak or strong linkage
effects. The third assumption says that a domestic
firm’s revenue is increasing (at a decreasing rate) in
its own output, decreasing in the output of its for-
eign rival, and increasing (decreasing) in the domestic
output of foreign firm 1 if that firm is a source of
positive (negative) spillovers to the industry. Later
in the analysis, we shall introduce additional assump-
tions.
Before developing the model, we need to
specify the FDI promotion policies that a domestic
government contemplates enacting. The obvious al-
ternatives are (i) a fixed subsidy to multinationals
that set up production facilities within the borders of
the host economy, and (ii) a subsidy per unit of do-
mestic output granted to multinationals. Both are
straightforward to analyse, but to examine the ef-
fects of a fixed subsidy requires comparing discrete
changes in equilibrium outcomes, which in turn re-
quires making assumptions about functional forms
and parameter values. Additionally, for a lump-sum
subsidy to raise welfare, FDI must generate positive
spillovers and not occur in the absence of a subsidy.
In most such cases, a per-unit subsidy will be the
optimal policy, not a lump-sum subsidy (since the
former equates the private and social return to FDI
while the later does not). In light of these issues, we
consider the effect of a per unit production subsidy
by the host economy on domestic output of foreign
firm 1. This allows us to examine whether a small
increase in the subsidy raises or lowers national wel-
fare, and so determine whether the laissez-faire level
of FDI is too high or too low from the perspective of
the host economy. A per unit production subsidy
roughly approximates many types of actual FDI pro-
motion policies.32
A related issue is how we treat production out-
side the host economy by foreign firm 1. Since the
firm is producing for the world market, it would only
maintain production in multiple countries if its unit
factor costs were equalized in those countries. Glass
and Saggi (1999) consider the case where FDI equal-
izes wages between host and source countries for
multinational firms. We consider this outcome to be
unrealistic, but our model could be easily extended
to treat this case. For simplicity, we assume that the
foreign firm moves its entire production of good 1 to
the host economy. This would occur in the event that
FDI by foreign firm 1 did not equalize factor prices
between the host economy and the foreign firm’s
home country. Foreign firm 1 may, of course, have
operations devoted to other products and industries
at home or in other countries. We ignore these, as
they do not impact on the host economy’s welfare.
Given the simple setup of the model, we need
to focus on just two sets of equilibrium conditions:
those for factor-market clearing and those for prof-
it maximization of firms producing in the host17 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
economy. Factor-market equilibrium requires that
supply equals demand in the market for unskilled
labour,
(1)
and in the market for skilled labour,
(2)
By assumption, each domestic firm chooses output
to maximize profit, taking as given the output of
its rival foreign firm. For domestic firm i, profit
maximization implies the following first-order con-
dition:
(3)
Second-order conditions are standard. There is a simi-
lar first-order condition for the foreign firm with
whom firm i competes. Except possibly for indus-
try 1, these foreign firms are located abroad. If foreign
firm 1 chooses to manufacture in the host economy,
its output choice is implicitly defined by the first-
order condition,
(4)
which reflects the fact that foreign firm 1 may be
given a per unit subsidy for producing in the host
economy. Since pairs of domestic and foreign firms
compete in a single world market, we can summa-
rize their profit-maximizing output choices in terms
of Cournot Best-Response Functions, yi=bi(Yi) and
Yi=Bi(yi), which are subject to standard conditions.33
The arrival of foreign firm 1 in the host economy
has three effects. First, an increase in production by
foreign firm 1 raises the demand for unskilled and
skilled labour in the host economy. Since manufac-
turing is relatively intensive in the use of skilled
labour, the relative demand for and the relative wage
of skilled labour rises. For domestic firms in the host
economy, the rise in z increases their marginal costs.
All else equal, higher marginal costs mean lower
output and lower profits. This effect applies to all
firms in manufacturing, and not just to the domestic
firm competing directly with foreign firm 1. Second,
an increase in production by foreign firm 1 gener-
ates a productivity spillover for domestic firms. If
this spillover is positive, it will, all else equal, cause
domestic firms to raise their output and earn higher
profits. The first and second effects work in oppo-
site directions, and so have an ambiguous impact on
domestic firm output and profits. The third effect is
isolated to domestic firm 1: as foreign firm 1 raises
its output, the price for domestic firm 1’s output falls,
causing it to reduce output and thereby earn lower
profits.
To consider these effects in more detail, we
examine the impact of a change in the production
subsidy to foreign firm 1 on host-economy welfare.
Since we have assumed that manufacturing firms
produce for the world market, we can examine the
welfare effects of a subsidy to foreign firm 1 with-
out taking consumer surplus in the host economy into
account. As long as the final consumers of foreign
firm 1’s products are located abroad, this simplifica-
tion is reasonable.34 For our purposes, the relevant
components of host-economy welfare are incomes
to unskilled and skilled labour, profits to domestic
firms, and the subsidy to foreign firm 1,35
(5)
Using the factor-market clearing condition for skilled
labour in equation (2), we can rewrite host-economy
welfare as:
(6)
We turn now to the thought experiment that is the
motivation for the model: what is the impact of an
increase in the production subsidy to foreign firm 1
on host-economy welfare? The base case from which
we begin is laissez-faire (zero subsidy). Determin-
ing the welfare consequences of a subsidy to the
multinational firm will then also determine whether
the social return to FDI exceeds the private return.
Totally differentiating equation (6), we obtain:
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The first two terms in equation (7) represent the
change in factor income, which is positive as long as
the subsidy causes foreign firm 1 to increase its out-
put. The third and fourth terms represent the change
in profits for domestic firms, which depends on the
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signs of the dyi terms and whether productivity
spillovers are positive or negative. If the rise in mar-
ginal costs is the dominant effect, domestic output
and profits fall, while if the productivity-spillover
effect dominates (and spillovers are positive), do-
mestic output and profits rise. The fifth term is the
direct cost of the subsidy to multinational produc-
tion.
To help interpret equation (7), we simplify the
expression. First, define φ i ≡  ri
2Bi’ ≥  0, which is the
strategic effect of own-industry changes in domestic
output on domestic profits. Given outputs are strate-
gic substitutes (by assumption), as a domestic firm
raises its output, it induces a reduction in output by
its rival firm, which in turn serves to raise domestic
firm profits. Next, define ßi ≡  r i
3λ i’, which is the di-
rect effect of the multinational productivity spillover
on domestic firm profits. Using ri
1-ai=z from equa-
tion (3) and combining equation (2) and assumption
(a1), we see that
 (8)
Given that skilled labour is in inelastic supply, any
increase in output by foreign firm 1 must be met by a
net reduction in output by domestic firms, such that
the total demand for skilled labour is unchanged.
Applying the definitions and equation (8) to equa-
tion (7), we obtain
 (9)
The welfare effects of the subsidy are transparent in
equation (9). The first term is the effect of the sub-
sidy to foreign firm 1 on factor incomes, net of the
direct subsidy cost. This term has to be negative. We
show this formally in a technical appendix, but the
intuition is straightforward. Beginning from a situa-
tion where the subsidy is zero, the foreign firm has
chosen output to maximize profits. If it increases
output, its profits, net of the subsidy, will fall. The
only way a subsidy can induce the firm to raise out-
put, therefore, is if it more then compensates the firm
for the extra costs it will incur by expanding output.
The second term in equation (9) is the strategic
impact of the subsidy to foreign firm 1 on the profits
of domestic firms. Absent spillovers, the rise in fac-
tor costs would induce domestic firms to lower
output, yielding them lower profits. Any firm that
does not receive a positive spillover, will without
question lower its output, producing a negative value
for φ idyi. Even for those firms that do receive a posi-
tive spillover, the effect of rising factor costs may
dominate, leading to a fall in output. We show this
formally in the appendix. From equation (8), for the
foreign firm to raise output the net change in output
for domestic firms must be negative. We anticipate,
then, that the only domestic firms whose output will
rise will be those receiving a substantial positive pro-
ductivity spillover.
The third term in equation (9) captures the im-
pact of the productivity spillover on domestic profits.
The larger the increase in foreign firm 1’s output,
the larger is this term. But larger increases in foreign
firm output also lay upward pressure on demand for
skilled labour, making it more likely that the second
term in (9) will be negative.
Under what conditions will a subsidy to domes-
tic production by a multinational firm be likely to
raise national welfare? We identify four key condi-
tions:
(i) the factors used most intensively in production
by the multinational firm are in elastic supply;
(ii) the domestic firms that compete for resources
with the multinational firm earn low to zero
economic profits;
(iii) multinational production generates large posi-
tive productivity spillovers for domestic firms
in competing and non-competing industries; and
(iv) the gain in consumer surplus from increased
competition in the domestic market is small.
Condition (i) guarantees that the impact of the
subsidy on factor costs for domestic firms will be
small; condition (ii) guarantees that the welfare
consequences from shifting production away from
domestic firms and towards foreign firms will be
small; and condition (iii) is necessary for a subsidy
to be worthwhile under any circumstances. Condi-
tion (iv) goes beyond the theoretical analysis we have
presented, but is an obvious point. We do not em-
phasize changes in consumer surplus, since if FDI
does happen to raise domestic market competition,
then the optimal policy is not a subsidy to multina-
tional firms but a generalized production subsidy to
offset the distortionary consequences of imperfect
competition.36 These conditions form the basis for
evaluating actual cases of FDI promotion policies,
to which we turn in the next section.
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B. The promotion of FDI in practice:
three cases
1. General Motors in Brazil37
In the last decade, Brazil captured the attention
of global automobile manufacturers. With Mercosur
providing tariff barriers against competition from
outside the southern cone, Brazil having the world’s
eighth largest automobile market, and strong pro-
jected growth in regional automobile demand (only
one in nine Brazilians owns a car), the major auto-
mobile producers either established or expanded
production capacity in Brazil and Argentina. By the
late 1990s, there were a dozen automobile manufac-
turers in Brazil alone. In 1998, VW owned 28 per
cent of the Brazilian market, Fiat 24 per cent, GM
22 per cent and Ford 13 per cent, with the rest of the
market divided among smaller manufacturers.
In the early 1990s, GM began to move aggres-
sively into Brazil, focusing initially on higher
end-products and touting its confidence in the coun-
try. By the late 1990s, GM had an annual production
capacity of 500,000 units, up from 170,000 in 1992.
VW, Fiat and Ford, in contrast, were introducing new
models relatively slowly, reflecting the cautious ap-
proach of many durable-goods manufacturers in the
wake of Brazil’s continuing struggle against high
inflation and slow growth. GM decided to make Bra-
zil a showcase for its new global production strategy,
based on simple and flexible manufacturing plants,
global sourcing of automobile parts, rapid introduc-
tion of new models, and a lean dealer network. This
strategy had shown success in Europe and the idea
was to develop it further in Brazil, with the goal of
applying it in Asia, Eastern Europe, and perhaps ul-
timately the United States.
GM’s long-run aim is to have half of its pro-
duction capacity outside the United States, compared
with only one fifth in 1990. (As GM has stepped up
its Brazilian operations, it has also expanded auto-
mobile production in other emerging economies,
including Argentina, China, Poland and Thailand.)
By the late 1990s, other automobile makers in Brazil
were following an approach similar to GM’s. VW, Fiat
and Ford, among others, decided to build new plants or
add capacity to their existing plants in the country.
In 1997 GM made the Blue Macaw project the
centerpiece of its Brazilian strategy. The project re-
volved around a new automobile assembly plant,
which would be GM’s third in the country, with an
annual capacity of 150,000 units. The plant would
produce a stripped-down version of the Opel Corsa,
a subcompact car, with an under $10,000 price tag.
Much of the production of the car would be
outsourced to suppliers, who would deliver entire
subassemblies of components to GM for final assem-
bly. GM’s plan was to develop this concept of
“modular assembly” in Brazil and then apply it to
other production facilities in Europe and North
America. GM chose the state of Rio Grande do Sul
as the site for the $600 million plant, with the idea of
completing the facility by the end of 1999. However,
Brazil’s currency crisis in early 1999 and the ensu-
ing recession caused GM’s sales in Brazil to fall by
27 per cent and delayed completion of the project
until early 2000.
GM’s plant, which recently opened, employs
1,300 workers, and locally based suppliers employ
another 1,300 workers. The plant houses 20 suppli-
ers, the most important of which are US, French and
Japanese companies. GM outsources all components
except powertrains, body welding, body panels, paint,
and final assembly.
The advantages of locating in Rio Grande do
Sul is that the state is close to the southern cone’s
major markets in southern Brazil, the Buenos Aires
region of Argentina and Uruguay. The state has a
more educated work force compared to the rest
of Brazil, but lower wages than in the highly in-
dustrialized nearby region of Sao Paulo. (Total
compensation for GM workers in Rio Grande do Sul
is expected to be $9 per hour, compared to $13 for
automobile workers in Sao Paulo.)
In return for agreeing to build a plant in a lightly
industrialized area, GM received a package of sub-
sidies from the state government of Rio Grande do
Sul. These included promises for direct subsidies to
GM to offset the costs of building roads, ports and
other infrastructure related to the plant; temporary
exemptions from value-added taxes; and a waiver of
import duties on machinery used in the construction
of the plant. While neither GM nor the state govern-
ment is willing to give precise figures, the subsidies
were reported to amount to $250 million, and the tax
breaks appeared to have the potential to equal
$1.5 billion over a 15-year period. GM executives
maintain that in the absence of these subsidies, the
firm would have located the plant in a more devel-
oped part of Brazil.
In May 1999, the government of Rio Grande
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nor, threatened to renege on the promised subsidies
to GM. Sharply higher interest rates in the aftermath
of Brazil’s currency crisis had raised borrowing and
debt-service costs in the country, and forced state
and federal governments to raise taxes and cut back
on spending. Rio Grande do Sul’s governor claimed
that his state could no longer afford the subsidies.
GM felt it was too close to completion of the project
to pull out. Instead, the firm lobbied the state gov-
ernment and the president’s office to have the
subsidies maintained. GM and the governor reached
an accommodation, whose details were not published
but appeared to involve a partial (but far from com-
plete) reduction in the subsidy. As part of this deal,
GM agreed to an early pay back a $150 million loan
from the state government which had been part of
the subsidy package.
2. Ford Motor Co. in Brazil38
Though Ford was initially cautious in its ap-
proach to the Brazilian market, the company
ultimately moved to expand its automobile produc-
tion capacity in the country in a manner similar to
GM. Throughout the 1990s Ford’s Brazililian opera-
tions lost money. To reverse the situation, Ford
decided to speed the introduction of new models,
reduce financing costs and reorganize its dealer
network. A key part of this strategy was Project
Amazon, the construction of a $700 million automo-
bile assembly plant in Rio Grande do Sul to produce
subcompact cars for the southern cone market. The
plant, which would be Ford’s fourth in Brazil, was
to employ 1,500 workers and was initially scheduled
for completion in 2001. The project would allow Ford
to incorporate Brazil into its global production strat-
egy of reducing the number of vehicle platforms and
engine/transmission families on which its cars are
based, while simultaneously increasing the number
of models available and the speed with which new
models are introduced. At the global level, Ford aims
to design and develop vehicles for worldwide mar-
kets in five vehicle centres: four in the United States
and one in Europe.
Similar to GM, Ford negotiated a package of
subsidies from the Rio Grande do Sul government in
return for locating in the state. The value of the sub-
sidies appeared to be quite similar to the package
GM received, consisting of $250 million in straight
subsidies for the construction of infrastructure re-
lated to the plant and temporary exemptions from
value-added taxes and import duties for plant ma-
chinery, whose total value was expected to reach
$1.5 billion over the life of the project (also set at
15 years).
In contrast to GM, Ford had barely initiated
construction of its project when Brazil’s currency
crisis hit in early 1999. Consequently, it had received
little in the way of subsidies from the Rio Grande do
Sul government, and in fact claimed to be owed $40
million in promised payments. Brazil’s crash hit Ford
hard, causing the company’s sales in the country to
fall by 27 per cent in the first half of 1999 relative to
the same period in the previous year. Ford’s market
share fell to 9 per cent (from 14 per cent two years
earlier). When the new governor of Rio Grande do
Sul announced in May 1999 that he was taking away
Ford’s subsidies, just as he was threatening to do to
GM, Ford decided to terminate construction in the
state and move the Amazon project to a new loca-
tion in Brazil. Later in 1999, Ford chose the north-east
state of Bahia, in a relatively poor region of Brazil,
as the new site for its plant, after considering several
other states (Parana and Santa Catarina). Although
few details are known, the package of incentives the
Bahian state government promised Ford appears to
be even more generous than what Rio Grande do Sul
had initially offered. The relocation of the plant site
has delayed completion of the facility until 2002.
The Bahia plant will be larger than the one origi-
nally planned for Rio Grande do Sul, requiring a
$1.2 billion initial investment, and will produce five
different models of the Ford Focus, a subcompact
car, with an annual production capacity of 250,000
units. The plant will have a similar design to GM’s
Blue Macaw plant, with suppliers of 17 parts housed
under the same roof as the automobile assembly fa-
cility. Also like GM, Ford’s suppliers will be
primarily foreign firms, which work with Ford in
other regions.
3. Intel in Costa Rica39
In 1996, Intel decided to build a $300 million
semi-conductor assembly and testing plant in Costa
Rica. Intel, which at the time had silicon-wafer
fabrication plants in Israel and Ireland and semi-con-
ductor assembly and testing plants in China, Malaysia
and the Philippines, chose Costa Rica over alterna-
tive sites in Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Mexico.
What makes the Intel decision notable is that Costa
Rica, a low-income country with a population of
3.5 million, offered little in the way of special in-
ducements to Intel. The firm, with a few exceptions,
received the standard package of incentives avail-21 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
able to other foreign firms that set up operations in
the country’s EPZs. In contrast to Brazil’s aggres-
sive luring of automobile production plants, Costa
Rica did not enter into a bidding war with other po-
tential locations.
Production of semi-conductors involves three
stages: the fabrication of silicon wafers and of semi-
conductor chips, and final assembly and testing. The
first two stages are the most skill- and capital-inten-
sive, with the fixed costs of constructing a fabrication
plant exceeding $1 billion by the mid-1990s. The
assembly and testing stages, in which wafers are
thinned and then cut into individual chips or inte-
grated circuits, is more labour-intensive than
fabrication, but is still skill- and capital-intensive
relative to many other manufacturing activities.
While chip fabrication plants are concentrated in
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of
China and the United States, assembly and testing
plants are increasingly located in developing coun-
tries. During the 1990s, Intel on average built a new
plant every nine months to meet the steadily increas-
ing demand for chips. Given short product life cycles
and rapid imitation by rivals, what Intel needs in its
global production sites is speed in ramping up pro-
duction and access to a dependable, well-educated
labour pool.
In Costa Rica’s EPZs, firms enjoy a series of
tax breaks as long as they engage in export produc-
tion.40 All firms are exempt from (i) import duties
on raw materials, components and capital goods;
(ii) export, sales, excise and municipal taxes; and
(iii) taxes on corporate income during the first eight
years following an investment, with a 50 per cent
exemption applying for the next four years. Foreign
investors face no restrictions on repatriating profits
or foreign currency management. Certain EPZs of-
fer additional incentives, including longer-term
exemptions from corporate income taxes and subsi-
dies for employment or employee training. As of
1997, there were 190 companies in eight industrial
parks operating under Costa Rica’s EPZ system.
With its rapid expansion of production capac-
ity, Intel is constantly looking for new production
facilities. In early 1996 it decided to build a 400,000
square feet plant, which would employ 2,000 work-
ers to assemble and test the latest Pentium micro-
processors. At the time, Intel anticipated that by 1999
the plant would process one quarter to one third of
the chips that it manufactured. For Intel, the required
features of a production site (given moderately large
fixed costs and the need to begin production quickly)
include political and economic stability, a sufficient
supply of professional and technical operators (pref-
erably in a non-union environment), ease of import-
ing components and exporting final products and
minimal lags in obtaining necessary permits and li-
censes. Costa Rica showered Intel with attention and
information, but did not employ extraordinary meas-
ures to attract the firm. Costa Rica did offer a few
concessions to Intel, all of which were extended to
other firms as well. These included waiving a 1 per
cent tax on assets (extended to all firms in EPZs),
increasing the number of foreign air carriers allowed
to fly into Costa Rica, lowering energy prices for
large buyers of electricity, and expanding training in
electronics and English in several of Costa Rica’s
technical high schools. Intel executives stated that
they chose Costa Rica based on the country’s long
history of stability, open trade and investment regime,
relatively high-quality primary and secondary edu-
cational systems, and recent success in attracting
other multinational firms in electronics.
C. Evaluation of FDI promotion cases
In this subsection we use the insights from the
theoretical model developed earlier to examine
whether on welfare grounds (i) Brazil was justified
in offering subsidies to GM and Ford, and (b) Costa
Rica would have been justified in subsidizing Intel.
We focus on the issue of subsidies and not tax breaks,
as tax breaks on income to foreign capital tend to
move a country towards to the residence principle
and therefore more efficient taxation (Costa Rica, in
particular, appears to have been close to having zero
taxes on direct foreign capital). Since state govern-
ments are the entities offering subsidies in Brazil,
we consider whether subsidies to FDI would be likely
to raise state welfare. A full treatment of this issue
requires a much more complete analysis than we of-
fer here. Our goals are simply to identify the key
questions behind whether subsidizing FDI was likely
to raise welfare and, based on casual evidence, to
identify some possible answers to these questions.
The model we developed earlier appears to be
applicable to both the Brazilian and the Costa Rican
contexts. In each, foreign firms are technologically
advanced relative to domestic ones; they operate in
markets which appear to be imperfectly competitive
at a regional, national, or global level; and they
produce primarily for export (Intel to the world mar-
ket, and GM and Ford to the broader Mercosur
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(i) Is FDI likely to raise production costs for do-
mestic firms (i.e. is the multinational firm
relatively intensive in the use of inelastically
supplied factors)?
To the extent that the scale of new production
by a multinational firm is large, the prices of
inelastically supplied factors used in produc-
tion may rise. As we showed earlier, a subsidy
to FDI in this context, all else equal, would
lower national welfare. Higher incomes (result-
ing from the subsidy) to factors employed in
domestic firms would simply offset higher pro-
duction costs to domestic firms, and higher
incomes to factors employed in the multina-
tional would be insufficient to cover the direct
cost of the subsidy.
Production of both automobiles and semi-con-
ductors appears to use relatively intensively
skilled labour: Intel prefers workers with at least
a high-school education, and a level of school-
ing well above the average in Costa Rica; GM’s
(and presumably Ford’s, also) hourly wage of
$9 is well above the Brazilian average. We
would expect skilled labour to be relatively
scarce in both Costa Rica, Rio Grande do Sul
and Bahia, such that the arrival of a multina-
tional firm would put upward pressure on the
local relative factor price.
(ii) Are there domestic firms which compete directly
with the multinational firm?
To the extent that a foreign firm faces no do-
mestic rivals, then any increase in its production
in the host economy is unlikely to directly lower
the profitability of domestic firms. In this case,
a subsidy to FDI would have no direct conse-
quences for competition in the industry of
relevance to host-economy welfare. (The ab-
sence of domestic rivals, however, also means
the potential absence of firms which could ben-
efit from productivity spillovers.) In Brazil,
foreign firms overwhelmingly dominate produc-
tion of automobiles and also appear to dominate
production of automobile parts. In Costa Rica
Intel faces no domestic competitors and would
appear to have few domestic suppliers.
(iii) Are there domestic firms which are likely to ben-
efit from productivity spillovers, or forward or
backward linkage effects from FDI?
If no domestic agents benefit from productivity
spillovers from FDI, then a subsidy to FDI will
lower national welfare (assuming the absence
of other distortions in the economy). This issue
is obviously difficult to evaluate in full. How-
ever, that GM, Ford and Intel face no domestic
rivals of any significance and rely primarily on
foreign firms for parts and components suggests
that there are few candidate domestic firms to
benefit from productivity spillovers in either
Brazil or Costa Rica (to the extent that such
spillovers even exist). Of course, domestic firms
in disparate industries may learn basic man-
agement skills simply from observing how
multinationals like GM, Ford and Intel struc-
ture their supply chains, introduce new products,
treat their workers, etc. But such learning ef-
fects would have to be substantial to justify the
subsidies Brazil granted to GM and Ford. Em-
pirical literature to date shows little evidence
of such effects.
(iv) Is the multinational likely to repatriate most
profits to its home country?
To the extent that a foreign firm does not share
rents with host-country suppliers or employees,
all returns to FDI accrue to shareholders of the
multinational, who are likely to be located
abroad. This issue is also difficult to evaluate,
but given the global reach of firms likely GM,
Ford and Intel (and their clear preference for a
non-union environment), there is no obvious
reason to expect these firms to share profits with
their host-country workers. Again, the magni-
tude of such profit-sharing would have to be
large to justify the Brazilian subsidies given to
Ford and GM.
A preliminary evaluation of the three cases of
FDI promotion suggests that the case for subsidies
to GM and Ford in Brazil was weak, and that subsi-
dies to Intel in Costa Rica would have been difficult
to justify. In both Brazil and Costa Rica, subsidy-
induced increases in production would appear to have
been likely to lay upward pressure on the relative
wage of skilled workers, thus reducing the profit-
ability of domestic firms. While the foreign firms in
question would appear to face few domestic rivals,
limiting the direct consequences of FDI for domes-
tic profitability, there would also appear to be a few
firms in the same lines of business which would ben-
efit from spillovers.
A particularly troubling feature of FDI subsi-
dies in Brazil is that they appeared to result from
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host foreign plants. Both GM and Ford appeared to
have already concluded that they needed to increase
production capacity in Brazil. The subsidies, then,
may have had little effect on whether the automobile
companies invested in the country and only have had
an impact on where they located their facilities within
Brazil. The end result of this inter-state fiscal com-
petition for FDI may be limited to extra burdens for
Brazilian taxpayers and excess capacity in the re-
gional automobile industry.
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined whether it
makes sense for countries to promote FDI. Our work
falls short of an in-depth analysis. The goal has been,
instead, to identify the key issues which determine
whether FDI promotion policies are justified, and
then to examine relevant academic literature to see
whether there is evidence that such conditions ap-
pear to hold in practice. Our focus has been, in
particular, on whether spillovers related to multina-
tional production justify FDI promotion.
For small open economies, efficient taxation
may or may not require lower taxes on capital in-
come to foreign residents than on capital income to
domestic residents. Absent market failure, there is
no reason to favour FDI over foreign portfolio in-
vestment. In practice, countries appear to tax income
from foreign capital at positive rates (if rates that are
lower than those for domestic capital) and to subject
different forms of foreign investment to unequal tax
treatment.
FDI appears to be quite sensitive to host-
country characteristics. Higher taxes deter foreign
investment, while a more educated work force and
larger consumer and industrial markets attract FDI.
There is also some evidence that multinationals tend
to agglomerate in a manner consistent with location-
specific externalities.
There is weak evidence that FDI generates posi-
tive spillovers for host economies. An oft-mentioned
possibility is that FDI raises the productivity of do-
mestic agents. While multinationals are attracted to
high-productivity countries, and to high-productiv-
ity industries within these countries, there is little
evidence at the plant level that FDI raises the pro-
ductivity of domestic enterprises. Indeed, it appears
that plants in industries with a larger multinational
presence enjoy lower rates of productivity growth.
Empirical research thus provides little support for
the idea that promoting FDI is warranted on welfare
grounds.
Using a simple theoretical model, we derived
conditions under which subsidies to FDI would be
more likely to raise host-country welfare. Subsidies
to FDI are likely to be warranted where multination-
als are intensive in the use of elastically supplied
factors, the arrival of multinationals to a market does
not lower the market share of domestic firms, and
FDI generates strong positive productivity spillovers
for domestic agents. Empirical research suggests the
first and third conditions are unlikely to hold. In the
three cases we examined – Ford and GM in Brazil
and Intel in Costa Rica – it appeared that the second
condition held but not the first or third conditions. It
thus appears likely that Brazil’s subsidies to foreign
automobile manufacturers may have lowered national
welfare. Costa Rica appears to have been prudent in
not offering subsidies to Intel.
There clearly is a need for much more research
on the consequences of FDI, but the impression from
the literature is that countries should be sceptical
about claims that promoting FDI will raise their wel-
fare. A sensible approach for host countries is to
presume that subsidies to FDI are not warranted, and
so avoid preferential treatment of FDI relative to for-
eign portfolio investment or domestic investment.
Deviations from such a policy would be justified only
where there is clear and direct evidence of substan-
tial positive spillovers associated with multinational
production and where multinationals are unlikely to
choose the optimal level of production (from the host
country’s perspective) without a subsidy or other
inducement.
If it is true that the benefits of FDI for host coun-
tries are insufficient to justify FDI promotion poli-
cies, then why do host-country governments continue
to offer multinationals special treatment? One an-
swer is that governments feel compelled to offer con-
cessions given that multinationals subject their
location decisions to bidding by potential host-coun-
try governments. The appropriate response is not to
validate auctions of this type but instead to seek in-
ternational cooperation among governments to
prevent multinationals from extracting all gains
associated with their presence in host economies. A
second answer is that promoting FDI serves the in-
terests of host-country politicians. Attracting multi-
nationals may benefit specific constituencies, from
whom politicians derive support, or may fit into po-
litical strategies of empire-building. Whatever the ex-24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 9
planation, countries are likely to be better served by
being cautious about promoting FDI, until we see
strong empirical evidence that the social rate of re-
turn on FDI exceeds the private rate of return.
Notes
1 Throughout the paper foreign investment refers to inward
foreign investment.
2 A recent UN study shows that during the period 1990–
1998 over 135 countries reduced regulatory restrictions
on FDI (UNCTAD, 1999c).
3 The Group of 24 consists of: Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo; Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala,
Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela; In-
dia, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka
and the Syrian Arab Republic.
4 That small open economies do tax corporate income at
rates comparable to or higher than large economies is
something of a puzzle. See Gordon (1992) and Gordon
and MacKie-Mason (1995) for a discussion. Relatedly,
Rodrik (1997) discusses how globalization contributes to
conflicts between an electorate demanding more social
insurance and a government able to tax fewer factors of
production.
5 From the perspective of global welfare, the residence prin-
ciple provides the basis for efficient international taxa-
tion. The income of all residents, whether originating from
domestic or foreign sources, is taxed at equal rates, while
non-resident income is untaxed. However, if all govern-
ments were to grant foreign tax credits (and many do), a
small open economy would lose little by taxing non-resi-
dent income up to the rates at which income is taxed in
the home countries of non-residents (see Avi-Yonah, 1999,
for a discussion).
6 One potential source of market failure we do not consider
is that related to imperfections in financial markets, which
some suggest may make FDI preferable to foreign portfo-
lio investment in that it may be less volatile (see Rodrik
and Velasco, 1999, on short-term capital flows). Hausmann
and Fernandez-Arias (2000) and Fernandez-Arias and
Hausmann (2000) cast doubt on this hypothesis, and also
discuss recent literature on currency crises and foreign
capital inflows.
7 Another argument for promoting FDI is that multinational
firms oblige governments to “bid” for the right to host
their new facilities. If governments fail to offer sufficiently
generous tax breaks, they may not attract FDI. A multina-
tional enterprise considering a large investment project
may be able to extract tax concessions because countries
have in effect granted it market power by allowing the
firm to hold a one-sided auction. The auction allows the
multinational to extract all benefits associated with its pres-
ence in a country. A preferred solution for host countries
in this case is multilateral cooperation to avoid one-sided
bidding for FDI. See Bond and Samuelson (1986), Black
and Hoyt (1989), and Janeba (1998) for alternative views
on the subject.
8 That multinational enterprises may be technologically ad-
vanced relative to local firms (Davies, 1977; Teece, 1977)
is not in itself a justification for promoting FDI. If multi-
nationals do possess superior technology, then we expect
the rate of return on their investments to be higher than
that for local firms, in which case multinationals require
no artificial inducement to choose the optimal level of
FDI.
9 Yet another possibility is that FDI reduces informational
barriers to trade and investment between the host economy
and the rest of the world (Rhee, 1990). Agents elsewhere
may lack complete information about factor productivity,
government policy, or the general business climate in the
host economy. By attracting FDI, the host economy may
signal to the rest of the world that it has a positive envi-
ronment in which to do business. In this case, there are
likely to be diminishing returns to promoting FDI. After
the first several multinational firms have established them-
selves in a country, any signal from additional FDI is likely
to be uninformative.
10 Other research suggests FDI may be detrimental to the
host economy. Recent variants of this argument include
the idea that, once established in a country, multinationals
favour high trade barriers and will lobby the host-country
government to raise tariffs (Bhagwati et al., 1987; Blonigen
and Ohno, 1998). There is some empirical support for this
view (Blonigen and Figlio, 1998). The difficulty of evalu-
ating the economic impact of potential policy changes re-
sulting from FDI leaves these issues beyond the scope of
this paper.
11 We include all countries for which data are available.
12 The non-G-24 countries were chosen to represent regional
diversity, important FDI sources (Japan), and countries
with policies that are relatively friendly towards FDI (Costa
Rica, Ireland, Thailand).
13 See Madani (1999) for more details on EPZs.
14 This statement is based on the presumption that foreign
capital is more mobile than domestic capital.
15 A comparison is further complicated by the proliferation
of bilateral investment treaties and the indirect effects of
trade polices on FDI. See UNCTAD (1999a and 1999b).
16 However, given widespread evasion of capital gains taxes
by non-resident foreigners in emerging economies, the ef-
fective capital gains tax may be zero in many cases.
17 See Markusen (1995, 1998) for surveys of the literature.
18 Formal theories of multinational enterprises address the
origins of ownership and location advantages in multina-
tional production, but not internalization advantages.
While there is extensive informal literature on transaction
costs and the organization of multinational production
(Caves, 1995), there is as of yet little formal modelling of
why multinational firms choose to own foreign subsidiar-
ies versus licensing technology or contracting out pro-
duction.
19 Although, FDI may lower incomes for some factors of
production in some countries.
20 To give an example: for US sales to Germany, the ratio
would be sales by affiliates of US multinationals in Ger-
many divided by the sum of these affiliate sales plus US
exports to Germany.
21 See Hanson (2000a and 2000b) for surveys of the litera-
ture and discussion of these issues.
22 Aitken et al. (1997) take a similar approach.
23 Many Japanese firms which invest in the United States
are part of industrial groups, which may influence their
response to host-region economic conditions (Belderbos
and Sleuwaegen, 1996).
24 For a detailed discussion of manufacturing plants in de-
veloping countries see Tybout (2000). In the United States,
Figlio and Blonigen (1999) find that counties in South
Carolina with more employment in multinational firms
experience higher wage growth, lower growth in public25 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
expenditure, and shifts in the composition of public spend-
ing away from education towards transportation and pub-
lic safety.
25 For a survey of the literature see Blomstrom and Kokko
(1998).
26 Caves also finds that for Canadian manufacturing (1965–
1967) industry average profitability of domestic plants is
positively correlated with industry average profitability
of foreign plants and negatively correlated with the aver-
age share of foreign plants in industry sales (which he
interprets as a pro-competitive effect of FDI).
27 See Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) for evidence that the
propensity to transfer technology abroad is not linked to
multinationality per se but rather to access to international
markets.
28 Other works cite less direct evidence of spillovers re-
lated to FDI. In many contexts, multinational firms de-
velop backward linkages with local industry (Behrman
and Wallender, 1976; Lall, 1980) or provide training to
local workers (Chen, 1983; Gehrschenberg, 1987). These
activities may create channels through which spillovers
could flow from multinationals to host economies, but
their occurrence in no way establishes that such spillovers
actually exist. Anecdotal evidence of FDI “demonstra-
tion effects”, in which local firms learn about modern
technology or management techniques by watching mul-
tinationals (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998), are plausible
but pure conjecture in the absence of formal statistical
analysis.
29 In a related work, Gorg and Strobl (2000) find that in Ire-
land the larger the presence of multinational firms in the
sector, the smaller is the size of domestic startup firms.
30 It is important to note that these results are for the direct
impact of FDI on domestic enterprises in the same lines
of activity. It is possible that FDI raises the productivity
of domestic agents through indirect, general-equilibrium
effects, such as backward-forward linkages or productiv-
ity spillovers common to all industries.
31 There are other potential spillovers from multinationals,
which in the interest of space are not discussed here. See
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) for a discussion of empiri-
cal research on the impact of multinationals on worker
training, industry linkages, industry competition, and
source-country economies.
32 Though subsidies for FDI are typically negotiated before
MNEs begin production, making them appear lump-sum
in nature, the fact that subsidies are often proportional to
plant capacity and delivered in portions as a project moves
towards completion makes them similar in effect to per-
unit production subsidies (e.g. imagine capacity subsidies
in a world in which firms choose capacities and then en-
gage in Bertrand price competition).
33 These are that bi’≤ 0, Bi’≤ 0, and bi’>1/Bi’. By the second-
order conditions to profit maximization, Cournot stability
conditions require that ri
11 + ri
12Bi’≤ 0 and Ri
11 + Ri
12Bi’≤ 0.
34 Industry 1 may, for instance, produce an input that is con-
sumed by domestic firms and then exported in the form of
a final good (e.g. hard disk drives which are assembled
into personal computers).
35 We assume that foreign firm 1 repatriates to its home coun-
try any profits it earns in the host economy.
36 That is, the market failure in this case is due to imperfect
competition, not to multinational production.
37 This subsection is based on material from the following
sources: Interview with Mustafa Mohaterem, Chief Econo-
mist for General Motors, 31 May 2000; Fritsch (1999:
A11); Kerwin and Muller (1999: 114); Fritsch and White
(1999: A1); Simonian (1997: 5). “GM picks suppliers for
Blue Macaw”, Automotive News Europe (1997: 8); Craig
(1999: 1); Kolodziejski et al. (1999: 66).
38 This subsection is based on material from the following
sources (in addition to those listed in the previous foot-
note): “Jac’s turnaround team”, Automotive News Inter-
national (1 February 2000: 16); “Ford plans to spend
$1 billion on its Brazilian operations”, The Detroit News
(22 September 1999: B3); Connelly (2000: 1); Mulligan
(2000: 5).
39 This subsection is based on material from Spar (1998)
and Reinhardt (2000: 110).
40 As in many countries, firms in Costa Rica’s EPZs are al-
lowed to sell a fraction of their output on the domestic
market (though few actually do).
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Appendix
DERIVATION OF THE WELFARE EFFECTS FOR THE HOST ECONOMY
In this appendix, we derive a more complete expression for the change in host-economy welfare, as stated in
equation (9). We begin by deriving equilibrium expressions for the change in output of domestic firms and
foreign firm 1. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions to profit maximization for foreign firm 1, we
obtain:
(A1)
Cournot stability conditions (see note 34) imply that
(A2)
which defines the curvature of the revenue function for foreign firm 1. A larger value for ∆ 1 implies that
marginal additions to revenue change relatively little as output expands (which we expect to be the case
where demand is more inelastic). Using (A2), we derive the change in output for foreign firm 1 as,
(A3)
This shows that output for foreign firm 1 rises only if the unit production subsidy exceeds the increase in
marginal costs from expanding output (as discussed in the text). Similarly, totally differentiating the first-
order conditions for domestic firm 1, we obtain,
(A4)
Cournot stability conditions imply that
(A5)
which allows us to write:
(A6)
For domestic firm 1, then, output unambiguously falls (the indirect strategic productivity effect is implicitly
embodied in the Cournot stability condition, since foreign firm 1, the source of the spillovers, is a direct
competitor of domestic firm 1).
For domestic firms i=2,…,N, the derivation is somewhat different, since these firms by assumption do not
interact strategically with foreign firm 1. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions for these firms, we
obtain:
(A7)
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Using the Cournot stability conditions for these firms, which are analogous to (A2), we find:
(A8)
Defining ρ i ≡  ri
13λ i’, which is the effect of the productivity spillover on the marginal productivity of output
(which we expect to be positive if the spillover is positive) and using equation (A3), we find that
(A9)
For domestic firms that do not compete against foreign firm 1 in product markets, the FDI subsidy has two
effects, which work in opposite directions (as discussed in the text). The first, embodied in the first term on
the right in (A9), is that rising factor costs lead to a reduction in output, and the second, embodied in the
second term on the right in (A9), is that the productivity spillover, to the extent it is positive, leads to an
expansion of output. Output for a given firm rises if the productivity boost from the spillover more than
offsets the rise in marginal cost from the increase in factor prices.
Combining equation (8) in the text with (A3), (A6) and (A9), we obtain the following expression for the
change in the wage of skilled labour:
(A10)
The skilled wage rises unambiguously if productivity spillovers from multinational production are positive.
In this event, (A3), (A6), (A9) and (A10) together imply that dY1 is positive, dy1 is negative, and dyi for i≠ 1
is of ambiguous sign (though we know from equation (8) in the text that the aggregate change in domestic
firm output must be negative).
Finally, combining equation (9) in the text with (A3), (A6), (A9) and (A10), we obtain a more complete
expression for the change in host-economy welfare from a small increase in a unit production subsidy to
foreign firm 1 (starting from s=0):
(A11)
If productivity spillovers are non-negative, then all individual parameters are non-negative in equation (A11),
in which case,
(A12)
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To interpret equation (A12), consider each term inside the brackets on the right. The first term is the direct
effect of spillovers on domestic profits. Positive spillovers increase revenues and profits directly, as cap-
tured by ßi (see main text and preceding appendix for definitions). The second term is the strategic effect of
domestic spillovers on profits. Even if higher factor costs make a domestic firm lower its output, positive
spillovers make the firm more aggressive relative to its foreign rival. The firm lowers its output by less than
it would have in the absence of spillovers. Spillovers thus moderate the loss in market share a firm experi-
ences from an increase in factor costs (but only for firms that do not compete directly against foreign firm 1).
(Of course, the impact of the spillover may be so large that the firm raises its output, even in the face of
rising factor costs. Some domestic firms, however, must lower their output (see equation (8).) This effect is
the product of three terms: φ i, the impact of the foreign rival firm’s output response to a change in the
domestic firm’s output on the domestic firm’s profits; γ i, the marginal responsiveness of domestic firm
profits to changes in domestic firm output; and ρ i, the responsiveness of domestic firm’s output to produc-
tivity spillovers from FDI.
The third term on the right in (A12) captures the loss in domestic profits due to rising factor costs. This term
depends on the interaction between two effects: the increase in demand for labour at unchanged factor
prices, which is the sum of labour demand from foreign firm 1 (D1) and the extra labour demand from
domestic firms induced by productivity spillovers (γ iρ i, which is the output response of a domestic firm to
the spillover); and the strategic effect of higher factor costs on domestic firm profits (the ratio term), which
results in domestic firms lowering output and ceding market share to the foreign rival firm. The fourth term
on the right captures the cost of the subsidy, which intuitively is proportional to the level of production by
the multinational firm.31 Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
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